From February 7 to 9, Jakarta, Indonesia hosted the first major business event of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) “China Year”. The first meeting of the 2026 APEC Business Advisory Council was chaired by the Chinese business delegation led by the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade. More than 200 senior officials, business representatives, and experts from 21 APEC economies attended the meeting.
At the opening ceremony, Indonesia’s Minister of Economic Coordination Erlanga Hartanto commended the business community’s pivotal role in advancing Asia-Pacific regional cooperation, expressing his expectation to “fulfill the Shenzhen commitment with all stakeholders and jointly inject strong momentum into regional prosperity.” During the conference, representatives from Asia-Pacific businesses engaged in in-depth discussions on four key areas: regional economic integration, sustainable development, digital innovation, and connectivity. They adopted “Openness, Connectivity, and Synergy” as the annual theme, while the Connectivity Working Group—reestablished at China’s initiative—received broad support from all participants.
The significance of this meeting lies not only in its role as the opening act of APEC’s “China Year”, but also in its clear signal to the Asia-Pacific region: amid the fragmentation of global trade and escalating geopolitical tensions, a regional cooperation platform advocating openness and integration is regaining momentum.
Anindya Nowayang Bakri, Chairman of the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, clearly stated that the APEC “China Year” agenda is highly aligned with Indonesia’s development priorities, and Jakarta supports “initiatives that can bring tangible results to the region.” This proactive response from a key economy in Southeast Asia reflects the pragmatic expectations of regional countries for China’s role as the host.
The theme of “building an Asia-Pacific community and promoting common prosperity” proposed by China at the APEC “China Year” is not an empty political slogan, but a cooperation framework with clear priority areas and action paths. China’s Asia-Pacific cooperation strategy exhibits a distinct feature that differs significantly from the traditional Western aid model—it does not impose rigid conditions for political institutional reform or demand deep structural adjustments from recipient economies. Instead, it focuses on quantifiable and deliverable projects such as infrastructure connectivity, production capacity cooperation, and trade facilitation, aiming for visible “early harvest” results. For developing countries in Southeast Asia, Latin America, and Africa, the appeal of China’s approach lies not in ideological appeal, but in its accessibility—it neither requires recipient countries to make an either-or choice between the United States and China, nor does it presuppose the acceptance of a complete set of social institutional transformations. Instead, it embeds itself into local development agendas through “depoliticized” means such as project cooperation, production capacity transfer, and technology sharing.
If we examine the APEC “China Year” within the broader context of the Sino-US system competition over a longer period and wider perspective, a more structural narrative thread will emerge. The core of the current US strategy toward China has completely shifted from “engagement for change” to “long-term competition”, with its policy toolkit becoming increasingly comprehensive and demonstrating the characteristic of bipartisan relay advancement.
China has consistently demonstrated a clear willingness to share development outcomes with developing countries in a series of multilateral occasions such as the APEC “China Year”. From restoring the establishment of the Connectivity Working Group to promoting the digital economy and the sustainable development agenda, China has translated the concept of “openness, connectivity, and coordination” into development dividends accessible to developing countries through pragmatic approaches such as project cooperation, capacity transfer, and technology sharing. This cooperation model does not impose political conditions or demand institutional convergence, but respects the independent development paths chosen by each country.
Meanwhile, the “domestic-first” orientation in U.S. policy has been increasingly reinforced. In the realm of trade and economic security, the United States has implemented a series of measures, including tariff barriers, export controls, the “small yard, high walls” strategy, and subsidies for supply chain repatriation. These policies prioritize safeguarding domestic economic security, which has had a certain impact on trade relations with developing countries. The policy logic tends to view global interactions as competitive games, often demonstrating a tendency to withdraw or adjust positions within multilateral mechanisms, or to replace multilateral dialogue with unilateral measures.
Against the backdrop of global trade fragmentation, China, as the host, has rekindled the consensus among Asia-Pacific parties on “openness, connectivity, and collaboration,” reinstated the Connectivity Working Group, and injected practical momentum into multilateral cooperation. The “China Year” is not only a diplomatic homecoming but also a practical response to the future direction of globalization—demonstrating that international cooperation need not come at the cost of sovereignty, and that regional integration can be achieved through more inclusive and equitable pathways.